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WEST VIBGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

quality, and the heating and ventilating systems more up to date
than the original plans called for.
The foundation and the ground floor are now almost completed
and the contractor is pushing the work rapidly. The building
will be ready for occupancy early next spring. When completed
it will embody the best features of law school buildings throughout
the country and will be one of the most complete and up to date
to be found anywhere. It should be a source of great pride not
only to the Bar, faculty, students and alumni of the University,
but also to the people of the state generally.
the
recent case of Hickel v. Starcher,' the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia, in passing on the validity of a deed conveying
real estate to the "heirs" of a person living at the date of the execution thereof, has construed the word "heirs" in its technical sense
and has held the deed void for uncertainty as to parties grantee.
The correctness of this decision, it is submitted, is based upon two
necessary findings: (1) that the deed conveyed an estate vesting in
possession in praesenti;and (2) that the parties named as grantees
were not in esse and ready to take the estate vesting immediately
in possession.
An essential requirement of common law conveyancing by deed
is that the party grantee should be designated with particular certainty.2 An important distinction, however, was made by this rule
between present and future estates. In the ease of present estates,
the certainty rule required not only (a) definiteness in the designation of the party grantee, but also (b) the present existence of
the party grantee designated ready immediately to take the estate
conveyed.3 In the case of future estates, definiteness in the designation of the party grantee was required, but it was never a requirement of the common law that the grantee of a future estate
should be in esse at the time of the creation of the estate.4 A future
estate, therefore, could be created by deed in an unborn child of a
living person or in the heirs of a living person.5 And such conveyCERTAINTY REQUISITE IN DEEDS AS TO PARTIES GRANTEE.-In

110 S. E. 695 (W. Va. 1922).
M
MAUPIN, MARKETABLE TITLE TO REAL ESTATE, § 18; 13 Cyc. 538.
s Newsom v,. Thompson, 2 Ired. 277 (N. C. 1842) ; Lillard 'V. Ruckers, 9 Yerg. 64
(Tenn. 1836).
, Preston v. Brant, 96 Mo. 552, 10 S. W. 78 (1888).
See TInFANy, REAL PROPERTY,
120.
1 See W. VA. CODE, sec. 11, ch. 71. Irwin v. Stovar, 67 W Va. 356, 67 S. E,
1119 (1910); Carter v. Reserve Gas Co., 84 w. Va. 741, 100 S. E. 738 (1919),
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ances do not fail for uncertainty as to parties grantee. But a
present estate to an unborn person or to the heirs of a living person
fails for uncertainty as to parties grantee.
At common law, however, the creation of future legal estates by
deed was restricted by the highly artificial rule requiring a particular estate to support the future estate.8 This rule was never applied to future estates created by will and under the Statute of
Uses -7 In many states this rule has been changed by statute.8
Section 5 of chapter 71 of the Code of West Virginia provides:
"Any interest in or claim to real estate may be disposed
of by deed or by will. Any estate may be made to commence
in futuro, by deed, in like manner as by will. And any estate
which would be good as an executory devise or bequest, shall
be good if created by deed."
This section and section 12 of chapter 71 which provides, "that
a contingent remainder shall in no case fail for want of a particular
estate to support it," would seem to have abolished the common
law rule requiring a particular estate to support the creation of a
future estate by deed. Hence any future estate that could be
created by way of remainder by deed at common law can now be
created without the intervention of a particular supporting estate.
Therefore, since a future estate in an unborn child of a living person, or in the heirs of a living person was valid at common law as
a contingent remainder, it would seem now under our statute the
same could be created immediately without the particular estate.
This conclusion is fortified by the provision of section 5, quoted
supra, that "any future estate may be made to commence in
futuro, by deed, in like manner as by will."
What future estates then could be created by will at common law
as a devise or bequest? A devise of a legal estate, without a supporting particular estate, could be created in the unborn son of a
person living at the death of the testator.' And a devise of a legal
estate, without a supporting particular estate, in the "heirs" of a
person living at the death of the testator was valid.'" Both the
English and the West Virginia courts have construed the word
6

TrrANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 119, 16 CYC. 649.

STI FAY, REAL PROPERTY, §§ 134 ana 135.
8 1 STI=SON, AMERICAN STATUTE LAW, §§ 1403, 1426.
IEAL PROPERTY, § 135.
9 TIFFAN,
2 Weld t. Bradbury, 2 Vern. 705 (Eng. 1715) ; Stuart v. Stuart, 18 W. Va. 675

(1881) ; Tomllnson v. Nichol, 24 W. Va. 148 (1884).
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"heirs" in its technical sense and held that the estate conveyed
vested in possession as of the date of the determination of the class
designated.
The question may now profitably be asked: Why should the
West Virginia court that has held valid an executory devise to the
"heirs" of a person living at the death of the testator as conveying
a future estate, hold void a deed to the "heirs" of a person
living at the date of its execution, when our statute expressly
provides that "any estate that would be good as an executory
devise or bequest shall now be good if created by deed?" The
answer to the question is found in the holding of the
court that the estate conveyed is one vesting in praesenti. The
word "heirs" being construed in its technical sense and the parties
designated as grantees not being presently ascertainable, the deed
therefore fails for uncertainty. It is submitted that the deed is
invalidated not by the construction of the word "heirs" in its technical sense but by the construction of the deed as conveying an estate in praesenti.
It is conceded that no other result could have been reached at
common law for the reason that the deed as a present grant is
void for uncertainty as to parties grantee, and is void also as a
future grant for the reason that there was no particular supporting
estate. But under our statute clearly a deed conveying a future
estate to the heirs of a living person to vest in possession on his
death would be valid. The only question then in the construction
of the deed in Hickel v. Starcher is: Did the grantors intend to
convey an estate in futuro? That such may have been the intent
of the grantors seems to have occurred to the court. The court
says: "The words 'unto the heirs' may make it a grant in futuro."
And again: "It [the granting clause] is the usual form of expression, and, if the grantors meant what they said in the granting
clause, it does not necessarily effect a grant in praesenti." But
that this was a grant in futuro does not seem to have been urged
upon the court, and section 5 of chapter 71 does not seem to have
been called to its attention. It is submitted that the fact that the
granting clause contains words of present grant cannot possibly
affect the construction of the deed. Words of present grant are
necessary to convey estates to commence in futuro as well as estates
11
to commence in praesenti.
.
1

Lauck v. Logan, 45 W. Va. 251, 31 S. E. 986 (1898).
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The deed must therefore be held void if construed as a grant
in praesenti:it will be held valid if construed as a grant in futuro.
Where alternative constructions are possible-one of which will
render the deed void-and the other of which will rendei the
deed valid-that construction will be adopted which will render
it valid. 2 In other words the grantor is presumed to have intended to make a valid deed. There could be no question of the
intent of the grantors and therefore of the validity of the deed, if,
after the grant, they had added the words "the same to take effect and vest in possession on the death of C. C. Hickel," or "the
grantors reserve an estate in the land herein conveyed during the
life of C. C. Hickel." Such conveyances have without exception
been held valid in West Virginia. 3 Yet it is difficult to understand how the addition of the words suggested would add anything
to the deed. The "heirs" of C. C. Hickel would not be determined
until his death and the estate could not vest until they were determined as a class. It is submitted that the construction of the word
"heirs" in its technical sense compels the conclusion that the grant
was of an estate to commence in futuro. This construction validates the deed, is in accord with the apparent intent of the grantors, and is, it is submitted, in harmony with the remedial provision
of the West Virginia statute.
FREDERICK L. LEMLEY.

Fairmont, W. Va.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OP YOUNG CHILDREN.-Although a
few early decisions held a child to the same rigid rule applied to an
adult in determining whether he had exercised due care to avoid
danger,' it has long been settled that the conduct of a child
should be measured by a different standard, generally stated to be
the care which is ordinarily exercised by children of the same age,
capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience, under the same or
similar circumstances. 2 If such considerations as these measure
the care which is required of a child, there must be an age at which
the doctrine of contributory negligence can have no application.
2 Higgins -v. Coal & Coke Co., 63 W. Va. 218, 59 S. R. 1064 (1907).
13 Hurst v. Hurst, 7 W. Va. 289 (1874); Lauck v. Logan, supra.
1 Neal v. Gillett, 23
(N. Y. 1867).
2 Birmingham etc. R.
Motor Delivery Co., 146
v. Oregon Short Line R.

Conn. 437; Burke v. Broadway etc. R. Co., 49 Barb. B291
Co. v. Mattison, 166 Ala. 602, 52 So. 49 (1909) ; Marius v.
App. Div. 608, 131 N. Y. Supp. 357 (N. Y. 1911) ; Thomas
Co., 47 Utah 394, 154 Pac. 777 (1916).
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